Could economic sanctions in Burkina Faso help to combat extremists in the Sahel?
- Stella Wilson
- Feb 23, 2022
- 5 min read
Updated: Feb 24, 2022
*At the time of publishing, economic sanctions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were yet to be implemented.*
The Sahel is a large region of Africa along the southern rim of the Sahara Desert which consists of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea. It is currently plagued by jihadists, militants linked to Al-Queda and Islamic State, who have been carrying out terror attacks in the region since 2015. They are particularly prominent in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Since 2016, 5,100 French troops have been deployed in the war against terror in the Sahel, as have 1,200 from the US, and 15,000 from the United Nations (UN). However, little progress has been made, and deaths caused by this war have increased tenfold between 2014 and 2020. French forces have been criticised for simply pushing the jihadists south, rather than weakening them to end the war. Governments in the Sahel have been reluctant to disarm militias as they are fearful of provoking coups, and yet one had staged.
For example, on January 23, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration announced that they had taken control of Burkina Faso, dissolving the government and suspending the constitution. Their leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damida, had previously criticised the way the war against jihadists is being waged by the government, which was echoed by much of the population. Even the former president of Burkina Faso, Roch Marc Kaboré, supported these criticisms, and admitted that civilian killings both by local security forces and Western soldiers mean that many people feel safer “living amongst terrorists than with their country’s own security forces.”
However, contrary to Damida’s beliefs, the coup is likely to help the Sahel’s jihadists, rather than combat them. Violence against the jihadists, which Damida plans to increase, is unlikely to lead to long-term peace, especially as maintaining this violent opposition is reliant on Western forces. Furthermore, the military junta (a group that rules a country after taking power by force) is likely to be occupied consolidating power in the capital, leaving the countryside more vulnerable to attacks by jihadists.
Building strong, accountable democracies will help to combat the insurgencies fuelled by corruption and bad governance. Therefore, in order to fight the jihadists, a stable, democratic government in Burkina Faso is essential, and economic sanctions from the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) could be an effective way to achieve this.
On January 28, ECOWAS suspended Burkina Faso and condemned the coup. At an emergency summit on February 3, ECOWAS decided to hold off on implementing sanctions, although it vows to impose sanctions if the situation in Burkina Faso does not improve. ECOWAS has previously used sanctions to combat coups in Mali and Guinea. The aims of sanctions are to force a country to change its behaviour, which in the case of Burkina Faso is to allow a democratic government that would be more effective in combating extremism than a military junta, as outlined above.
To examine whether sanctions should be used against Burkina Faso, two questions must be addressed — whether sanctions would encourage the junta to allow the reinstating of a democratic government, and whether the potential disadvantages to the population outweigh the benefits of imposing sanctions.
The success of sanctions is a contested issue. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), only 35 percent of sanctions imposed by the US have been successful. A few cases which make sanctions more likely to be effective, presented by PIIE include:
the target country is economically weak and politically unstable
the sanctions are imposed in response to international issues
the sanctioning country avoids high costs to itself
the sanctions are imposed by democracy, on democracy
Furthermore, multilateral sanctions (sanctions enacted by a group of countries) are considered to be less risky, as it is more difficult to blame a single country for a sanction’s impact, and can be more effective as the impact on the sanctioned country is more severe. Therefore, the multilateral nature of sanctions that would be imposed by ECOWAS could make them more successful.
Sanctions imposed on Burkina Faso would be in response to domestic events, rather than international — this makes them less successful as both the junta and citizens would perceive the sanctions as an infringement on their sovereignty, and only as outside interference. Similarly, sanctions are most likely to be effective against democracy, as the government is more concerned about the negative image a sanction would create, so the autocratic nature of Burkina Faso’s ruling force could make sanctions less successful.
However, Burkina Faso is economically weak and unstable, making sanctions more likely to be successful as they would have a larger impact on the population, where millions are in danger of starvation. High costs to the sanctioning countries could easily be avoided — for example, Burkina Faso is the US’s 179th largest trading partner, meaning that restricting trade would be insignificant to the US. Thus it could implement wider, longer-lasting sanctions, which would have a bigger effect on Burkina Faso, making sanctions more likely to be successful. If sanctions are implemented quickly and are accompanied by significant diplomatic effort, they are even more likely to be effective.
Overall, it is unclear whether sanctions against Burkina Faso would be successful. Therefore, considering the effects of the sanctions will be necessary to assess whether the possible benefits of successful sanctions outweigh the risks to the population.
To predict the effects of sanctions on the population of Burkina Faso, it is useful to examine their impact in Mali which has been sanctioned since January 9, after the military junta refused to hold elections. On February 2, Mali defaulted on its interest and principal payments totalling $31.6 million, as sanctions meant that the country was unable to access its account with the regional central bank. This is likely to lower the credit rating of the country, resulting in higher interest rates and higher borrowing costs. Defaulting also discourages domestic and foreign investment in the country, a component of aggregate demand, which will restrict economic growth and development in Mali.
According to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Mali faces a food insecurity crisis — over 7.5 million people are already reliant on humanitarian aid. 13 Non-Governmental Organisations, including Oxfam, are calling for urgent humanitarian exemptions so that they can continue their work in Mali, as it is currently being hindered by the sanctions.
Therefore, sanctions in Mali that have proven to be harmful to citizens could lead to increasing support for extremists and exacerbate serious humanitarian crises in an already fragile country. The effect is likely to be similar in Burkina Faso, where, according to Action against Hunger, life-threatening hunger is worryingly common, and large numbers of people are suffering due to poverty, COVID-19, conflict, and climate change. Consequently, the implementation of sanctions would restrict economic development and essential humanitarian aid. This is likely to create desperation and disaffection among citizens, which could encourage them to turn to extremism, worsening the war against terror in the Sahel.
The humanitarian risks from imposing sanctions far outweigh any possible benefit. Therefore, to avoid restricting economic development and exacerbating poverty and hunger, sanctions should not be imposed. Instead, patience from international bodies and countries is key to building sustainable democracies and combating extremism. Neither of these can be achieved quickly, as the war in Afghanistan that lasted for 20 years, has proven. Foreign forces should also focus on building diplomatic relationships and encouraging peace, which have proven to be effective in Mali, where over 40 local peace deals have helped to relieve the conflict. These less violent strategies could also create more opportunities for economic growth and development, improving living standards in Burkina Faso.
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